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Tort Liability of Public Officers and Employees
in Ohio
No area of government liability in tort is more studded with
subtle distinctions than the individual liability of public officers who
cause injuries in performing their official duties. That liability of
the officers should exist at all might be explained as resulting frbm
the old idea of sovereign immunity taken in conjunction with the
maxim of common law jurisprudence that "For every wrong there
is a remedy." A no less compelling basis for this liability is the
belief that no one should be above the law and so be in a position
to deal irresponsibly with the citizenry. The elimination of sovereign
immunity seems to be a first essential to a complete solution of the
problem,' but such renovation of concepts has not been forthcoming.
A rising tide of exceptions has waived the immunity of the sover-
eign in tort in particular instances but exceptions they are and the
rule remains.2
The immunity of judges, legislators, and top personnel of the
executive branch, assures them an almost absolute privilege against
suit, and the generally privileged character of discretionary action
on the part of other administrative officers permits many torts to
be committed without civil liability.
The judiciary has preserved its immunity to protect itself from
liability even when the acts are dictated by malice. Many reasons
for such a rule have been suggested' but at the core of them all is
the "necessity of having judges who are not deterred by the fear
of vexatious suits or personal liability,.and the manifest unfairness
of placing any man in a position where his judgment is required,
and holding him, at the same time, responsible according to the
judgment of others."5 Ohio follows the rule that judges acting within
the scope of their authority are not answerable in a private action
for erroneous exercise of their judicial discretion,' but if they t'rans-
' Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 Mrxx. L. REV.
263, 264 (1937).
2 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110
2401, 2411, 2412, 2617-2680; 60 STAT. 842 et seq. (1946); 61 STAT. 722 et seq.
(1947); 28 U.S.CA. §921 et seq. (1946); Oirro GEN. CODE §§2408, 3714-1
(1937).
3 Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (U.S. 1871).
'Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 IV/mnw. L. REv.
263, 271 (1937); 2 COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 424 (4th ed. 1932).
5PROSSER, TORTS 151 (1941).
6 Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St. 171, 119 N.E. 451 (1918);
Truesdell v. Combs, 33 Ohio St. 186 (1877).
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cend the limits of their authority they are answerable to any person
whose rights are invaded.7 The exception affords little protection
since a judge transcends the limit of his authority only when he acts
totally without his jurisdiction as prescribed by law. It has been
said that a judge acts only in excess of jurisdiction, and not without
jurisdiction, where, having jurisdiction of the subject matter gener-
ally, he erroneously decides that the facts of the particular case
bring it within his jurisdiction. Thus the erroneous finding of a
judge in a divorce proceeding that the petitioner had been a resi-
dent of Ohio for one year, was held to be only in excess of jurisdic-
tion and therefore privileged, since the court had jurisdiction of
divorce generally." Such a distinction between "without" and "in
excess of" jurisdiction seems to destroy any semblance of an objec-
tive standard and makes official liability for jurisdictional determi-
nation depend upon reasonableness under the circumstances. If
such is the test, a more forthright statement of the law by the
courts would afford a better basis for prediction. The judge of a
court of general jurisdiction in Ohio is presumed to have acted
within the scope of his authority; I the judges of the inferior courts,
such as magistrates' and mayors' courts, enjoy no such presump-
tion." It has been suggested that judges of the inferior courts
should be granted a greater immunity where they act in good faith
and without malice since they are not as learned in the law and are
more likely to err." The suggestion has not been followed by the
Ohio courts.
The immunity extended the judiciary has likewise been be-
stowed upon the legislative branch of our government. The Ohio
Constitution confers absolute immunity upon the members of the
legislature for any speech or debate carried on in either house.'2
As a general rule, the members of legislative bodies are not held
responsible in civil actions, in the absence of corruption, for voting
either for or against any particular legislation. 3 This is true of
members of local legislative bodies as well as representatives in a
state legislature. In Hicksville v. Blakeslee4 an effort to hold mem-
bers of a villiage council individually liable for voting the sale of
bonds in a manner prohibited by law failed because the court found
7 Truesdell v. Combs, supra note 6.
sMacBride v. Giuld, 3 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 469 (1905).
9 Truman v. Walton, 59 Ohio St. 517, 529, 53 N.E. 57, 59 (1899).
10 Truman v. Walton, supra note 9; Truesdell v. Combs, 33 Ohio St.
186 (1877).
1 Truman v. Walton, supra note 9.
12 OHIO CONST. Art. II, §12.
13Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); See note, 22 A.L.R. 119,
125 (1922).
14 103 Ohio St. 508, 134 N.E. 445 (1921).
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that the councilmen were acting in good faith; it being said obiter
that the motives of the legislator in the exercise of his discretion
cannot be questioned. 15 This case has solidified the law in Ohio
and has been considered controlling in several recent opinions of
the Attorney General.16 Other courts have imposed liability upon
legislators where they voted an appropriation for their own benefit
and have made each of them liable as for a conversion of trust
funds.17
The privilege extended members of the judiciary and legisla-
tures is also enjoyed by the highest executive officers in the federal
and state governments. 8 This protection is afforded so long as they
do not exceed the discretion vested in them by law and clear proof
of abuse of such discretion must be shown to justify judicial inter-
ference.10
The individual liability of public officials in the above three
categories is moderately well defined. It is only when we arrive at
the fourth group, those officers whose duties are not regarded as
distinctly legislative, executive or judicial, that confusion appears.
This group comprises the great body of lesser public officials and
includes all administrative personnel. It is from these officials that
most of the injuries result but it is here that our jural relations are
the least well defined and most unpredictable due to the distinctions
built up by the courts. Thus even in this area many injuries go
unredressed.
If the duty is owed to the public, a failure to perform, or an
inadequate or erroneous performance, is a public and not an indi-
vidual injury and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public
prosecution. On the other hand if the duty is owed to an individual
then a failure to perform it properly is an individual wrong and
may support an individual action for damages.20 In the former the'
duty exists for the benefit of all members of the public and ordi-
narily no one member can maintain an action for damages against
the officer for failure to perform such duties since an individual
member of the public can recover only such damages as inure to him
over and above the damage that is sustained by all members of the
body politic. To perfect a cause of action against an officer the
petitioner must establish, in addition to the other requirements nec-'
15 Id. at 519, 134 N.E. at 449.
26 1939 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (Ohio) No. 1330; 1937 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (Ohio)
No. 1464.
17 Russell v. Tate, 52 Ark. 541, 13 S.W. 130 (1890).
"'Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.
483 (1896); Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87 (U.S. 1845).
19 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Powers Co. v.'Olson, 7
F. Supp. 865 (D.C. Minn. 1934).
20 Rose v. Ritter, 1 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 321 (1903).
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essary for tort, a duty owing to himself and a breach of that duty.
In Rose v. Ritter '1 the petitioner sought damages for injuries occa-
sioned by his being imprisoned in an unsanitary dungeon at the
order of the defendant, the superintendent of the workhouse. The
court held that the defendant was not civilly liable to the plaintiff
since the duty of the superintendent to take corrective and dis-
diplinary action was not owed to the individual inmates but to the
public in general, and any breach of that duty must be redressed by
public prosecution.
The courts have categorized the duties of administrative officers
as either discretionary or nondiscretionary or, as otherwise phrased,
quasi-judicial or ministerial. A discretionary or quasi-judicial duty
has been defined as one involving the investigation and determina-
tion of a state of facts, with the resultant exercise of discretion or
judgment as to the propriety of the action to be taken with refer-
ence to the facts ascertained..2  Conversely, a nondiscretionary or
ministerial duty is said to be one which is to be performed in obedi-
ence to law without the exercise of judgment as to the propriety of
the duty or to the expediency of performing it. 2 3 An act which is
classed as discretionary is privileged and an officer will not be held
civilly liable for damages resulting from his ill-exercised discretion
as long as he acted honestly and in good faith..2 4 On the other hand
a ministerial act improperly done frequently results in the civil
liability of the officer regardless of sincere motives.2 5  Ohio as-
sumedly adheres to the ministerial classification2 6 but cases are lack-
ing that establish personal liability upon such a basis. Rather than
make the officers' civil liability turn upon such a neat distinction
the Ohio cases seem to have adopted a test similar to that suggested
in the latter part of this article, i.e. unreasonable conduct under the
circumstances. Ohio has adopted the ministerial classification in
other actions 2 but apparently has succeeded in escaping the classi-
fication in the field of civil liability. Were the activities of a par-
ticular office to be classified in their entirety as involving either
ministerial or discretionary duties the problem would be simplified
but under the present state of the law each office includes both
21 See note 20 supra.
22 Board of Education v. Commissioners, 10 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 505, 510
(1909).
23 State v. Donahey, 110 Ohio St. 494, 144 N.E. 125 (1924); State v.
Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612, 64 N.E. 558 (1902).
24 Gregory v. Small, 39 Ohio St. 346 (1883); Stewart v. Southard, 17
Ohio 402 (1848).
25 Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MiNN. L. REV.
263, 297 (1937); PRossER, TORTS 152 (1941).
2632 OHIO JUm. 961 (1934).
27 State v. Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612, 64 N.E. 558 (1902); State v. Chapman,
67 Ohio St. 1, 65 N.E. 154 (1902).
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ministerial and quasi-judicial functions. Thus the real issue is
whether the particular act complained of is ministerial or quasi-.
judicial. The distinction, if one really exists, would appear to be a
matter of degree, as it is difficult to conceive of any official act that
does not require some discretion in the manner of its performance. "8
Courts have said that an act may be discretionary in character, but
once discretion has been exercised and the officer has committed
himself on a course of action, then the performance becomes purely
ministerial and a wrong committed in the course of administration
gives rise to a civil cause of action. Thus it might be said that every
duty culminates in a mere ministerial act.
Some courts have further complicated the classification by
drawing a distinction between ministerial misfeasance and non-
feasance. A sound basis for this distinction is not evident as it
would seem that damages resulting from nonaction should afford
a predicate for liability as readily as those due to affirmative action
which was taken in error. Ohio has been said to embrace the dis-
tinction3" but the cases do not support that conclusion. In fact the
Ohio courts have distinctly held that a public officer and his surety
are liable to all persons unlawfully injured by the nonfeasance or
misfeasance of such officer in the conduct of his office.3 1
An attempt has been made in the cases to differentiate between
the acts of public officers done without jurisdiction and those which
are merely "in excess of" jurisdiction.32 It is said that the concep-
tion that "nonexistence can be less than nonexistence" is certainly a
fiction, 3 and it is added that the injury to the plaintiff, or the
hardship upon an officer who honestly believed that he was acting
properly, is the same in either case. Whereas an act without juris-
diction is given no protection,34 an act that is merely in excess of
jurisdiction is privileged to the same extent as a properly authorized
function. Although such a distinction is generally applied to all
officers, it is most evident in cases involving the judiciary 25 How-
ever, it has been held that a ministerial officer acts without his
jurisdiction when he executes any process, upon the face of which
it appears that the court which issued it has not jurisdiction of the
28 Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162; 189 Pac. 462, 468
(1920).
29Smith v. Iowa City, 213 Iowa 391, 239 N.W. 29 (1931); Stevens v.
North States Motors, 161 Minn. 345, 201 N.W. 435 (1925).
-o Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative officers, 21 MNN. L. REV.
263, 298 (1937) citing Thomas v. Wilton, 40 Ohio St. 516 (1884).
81 Commissioners of Knox County v. Blake, 2 Ohio St. 147 (1853).
C PRossER, TORTS 153 (1941).
83National Surety Co. v. Miller, 155 Miss. 115, 127; 124 So. 251, 254
(1929).
C4 Loomis v. Spencer, 1 Ohio St. 153 '(1853).
85 See page 502.
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subject matter, or of the person against whom it is directed. But
if the subject matter of a suit is within the jurisdiction of a court,
but there is want of jurisdiction as to the person or place, the
officer who executes process issued in such suit, is no trespasser
unless the want of jurisdiction appears on the face of such process.0
The problem of jurisdiction is closely analogous to that of acts
done under an unconstitutional statute. An early Ohio case said
that an officer acting under an unconstitutional statute was en-
tirely without jurisdiction and liable as a trespasser,3 7 but later de-
cisions, not involving personal liability of a public official, repudi-
ated the doctrine and held that the unconstitutional statute confers
such color of title as will constitute one a de facto officer and offers
protection for acts performed in compliance with the statute.
There is a noticeable absence of the application of the doctrine
of respondeat superior in tort liability of public officials. Although
one officer is subordinate to the other, they are said to be of equal
dignity and torts of the subordinate will not be imputed to the
superior.3 9 This is true even of a subordinate who has been ap-
pointed by the officer sought to be charged, where there has been
no negligence in the selection of the subordinate. Before the su-
perior can be charged personally it must be shown that he ordered
the act to be done.40 The term subordinate as it has been used does
not include deputies, as the acts of a deputy are in law the acts of
the principal and he is responsible for them.41 A deputy is one
appointed as a substitute to act for another.4 2 He is the alter ego
of the officer and in the contemplation of the common law, his acts
are the acts of the officer himself.43 The deputy is appointed only
by the principal, and is removable at his pleasure," and so it is
reasoned that the liability resulting from acts of the deputy should
be borne by the principal. The distinction between deputies and
other subordinates might have been valid at common law but is
questionable today. Many subordinates serve at the pleasure of
their superior, are hired and fired in his discretion, and a true
master servant relationship exists.
The law as it now stands is far from satisfactory and several
36 Champaign County Bank v. Smith, 7 Ohio St. 42, (1857).
37 Loomis v. Spencer, 1 Ohio St. 154 (1853).
38 State v. Gardner, 54 Ohio St. 24, 42 N.E. 999 (1896); Kirker v. Cin-
cincinnati, 48 Ohio St. 507, 27 N.E. 898 (1891); Ex Parte Strang, 21 Ohio St.
610 (1871).
30 Conwell v. Voorhees, 13 Ohio 523 (1844).
40 Conwell v. Voorhees, supra note 39.
-1 OHio GEN. CODE §9 (1940); Warwick v. State, 25 Ohio St. 21 (1874).
42 State v. Metzger, 10 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 97, 106 (1910).
- Warwick v. State, 25 Ohio St. 21 (1874).
"Warwick v. State, s-upru uuL.! -2a.
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alternatives would seem more desirable. A complete solution of
the problem would be a total abolition of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity whereby the state and its local units would assume re-
sponsibility for tortious acts of their officials. The extra burden
could easily be absorbed by the sovereign but the desirability of
such a solution is questionable. The less sincere public official
might become immune to any sense of responsibility if the deter-
rent of civil liability were removed. A second solution might be
one similar to that provided by the Federal Tort Claims Act
whereby the injured person has his choice of suing the government
or the tortfeasor. As a third solution we might retain the civil
liability of public officials but adopt the cure suggested by Mr.
Jennings that the criterion for liability should be whether the
officer has acted unreasonably under the circumstances, whether
his act be regarded as discretionary or ministerial, or with or with-
out jurisdiction. 5 An honest, reasonable mistake should not be
penalized, nor should an unreasonable blunder, or corrupt or malic-
ious conduct, be invested with immunity. A few cases have recog-
nized the merit of such a rule of liability and have shown a trend
in this direction." In fact, as suggested previously, the language
of some of the Ohio cases would seem to commit the courts to a
position not too far removed from that of Mr. Jennings. Typical of
the Ohio cases is Thomas v. Wilton. 7 where the court failed to dis-
cuss the ministerial or discretionary character of the act but denied
liability on the ground that the defendants "acted in their official
capacity, in good faith and in the honest discharge of official duty."
Language such as this might well be used as a stepping stone for
the simplification of tort liability of public officials in Ohio.
George D. Massar
45 Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. Rzv.
263, 301 (1937).
46 Tyrell v. Burke, 110 N.J.L. 225, 164 Atl. 586 (1933); Silva v.
MacAuley, 135 Cal. App. 249, 26 P. 2d 887, 27 P. 2d 791 (1933); Wallace v.
Feehan, 181 N.E. 862 (Ind. App. 1932).
4 40 Ohio St. 516 (1884).
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